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JOB FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS, AND ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER 
THE ADA: RECENT EEOC DECISIONS 
E. PIERCE BLUE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 requires of employers, 
in one word, is flexibility. The law insists that employers reconsider standard 
practices and methods of performing jobs in light of an individual with a 
disability’s unique abilities and skills. 
In some areas of employment, this message has been received and readily 
accepted. Employers understand that the ADA might require them to modify 
their facilities (e.g., a heightened desk for a person in a wheelchair) or provide 
additional services or equipment to enable persons with disabilities to perform 
jobs (e.g., a screen reader for a person with a visual impairment). 
In other areas, however, there is still resistance to the modifications that 
the ADA requires. This resistance is particularly acute in relation to physical 
job requirements and attendance standards. 
The symposium jointly convened by the Saint Louis University Center for 
Health Law Studies and William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law 
focused on disability rights and the health care workforce. As my co-panelist, 
Professor Nicole Porter, noted, work in the health care field is particularly 
challenging for persons with disabilities precisely because health care jobs 
often have rigid physical requirements and attendance policies.2 This essay 
describes three recent decisions from the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) in the federal sector that 
discuss how these policies should be evaluated under the ADA: a case 
involving a vision standard applied to an applicant to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI),3 a case challenging a rotating shift policy used by the 
 
* E. Pierce Blue currently serves as an Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Chai R. Feldblum of 
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This essay contains only the 
opinions of the author. It does not reflect the views of Commissioner Feldblum or the EEOC 
generally. 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). 
 2. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Difficulty Accommodating Healthcare 
Workers, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2015). 
 3. Nathan v. Holder, Decision No. 0720070014, 2013 WL 3965241 (E.E.O.C. July 19, 
2013). 
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Customs and Border Patrol,4 and a case where a worker in the United States 
Postal Service (USPS) disputed the validity of a lifting standard.5 
These cases broadly reinforce the need for flexibility in the application of 
general policies to persons with disabilities. They also highlight the importance 
of properly classifying policies. The ADA is an intricate law and it establishes 
a number of different defenses for different types of employment standards.6 
The manner in which a policy is labeled and defended, as these cases show, 
can have a vast impact on the protections available under the ADA to a person 
with a disability. 
II.  THE EEOC IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR 
The readers of this essay can be forgiven for asking what the author is 
talking about when he mentions EEOC decisions in the federal sector. The 
EEOC’s role in adjudicating complaints of employment discrimination by 
federal employees is one of its lesser appreciated functions. 
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[a]ll personnel 
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . shall be made 
free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”7 The statute further states that the EEOC “shall have [the] authority to 
enforce the provisions . . . of this section through appropriate remedies . . . and 
shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary 
and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section.”8 Section 
 
 4. Petitioner v. Johnson (Alvara), Decision No. 0320110053, 2014 WL 3571431 (E.E.O.C. 
July 10, 2014). 
 5. Complainant v. Donahoe (USPS), Appeal No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375 
(E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 2013). 
 6. For example, if an entity claims that an individual is not qualified because that person 
cannot perform an essential function of a position, with or without accommodation, the entity 
must establish that the function is essential and not marginal. See Regulations To Implement The 
Equal Employment Provisions Of The Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) 
(2015) (listing reasons why a job function may be considered essential). If the entity chooses to 
deny a request for accommodation because of the impact such accommodation will have on its 
finances or operation, the entity must meet the undue hardship defense. Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). And if an entity believes that a 
person is not qualified to perform a job because she or he cannot meet a qualification standard, 
including a safety standard, the entity must show that the standard is job-related and consistent 
with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(6)-12113(b)-(c) (2012). 
 7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2012). The statute originally gave 
the Civil Service Commission the authority to enforce this provision. That authority was 
transferred to the EEOC through President Carter’s Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978. See 
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at § 1366 
(2006), and in 92 Stat. § 3781 (1978). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] JOB FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS, AND ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA 21 
501 of the Rehabilitation Act grants the EEOC the same authority over claims 
of discrimination on the basis of disability.9 
The Commission enforces these responsibilities through what is known as 
the “1614 process,” named for the section of the Code of Federal Regulations 
where it resides.10 The 1614 process has three basic components. The first 
occurs in the agency. If an employee or applicant believes he or she was 
discriminated against by the agency, the employee has forty-five days from the 
discriminatory event to make contact with an agency equal employment 
opportunity (EEO) counselor.11 The employee works with the EEO counselor 
to either resolve the complaint or file a formal charge of discrimination.12 If 
the employee or applicant elects to file a formal charge, the agency investigates 
the complaint and produces a Final Agency Decision (FAD) on its merit.13 
After a FAD is issued, the employee/applicant can appeal the decision to 
the EEOC.14 The Commission will invite briefs from the parties and issue a 
written decision based on a de novo review of the record.15 This is the final 
step in the process for the agency—the agency does not have the right to 
appeal a Commission decision. An employee or applicant, however, retains the 
 
 9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794a (2012). Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that 
each federal agency shall “provide[] sufficient assurances, procedures and commitments to 
provide adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities for individuals with 
disabilities.” 29 U.S.C. § 791(b). That commitment includes both an affirmative action 
component and a nondiscrimination component. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204 (2015). For complaints of 
nondiscrimination, section 501 states that the “standards used to determine whether this section 
has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.” 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act instructs that 
the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . 
shall be available” to complaints under section 501. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). 
 10. 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2015). 
 11. Id. § 1614.105(a)(1). 
 12. Id. §§ 1614.105-.106. 
 13. Id. §§ 1614.108-.110. I am trying to summarize the process, so I have simplified certain 
elements of it. The requirements of an investigation are quite onerous and the applicant/employee 
also has the option of requesting a hearing and recommended decision from an EEOC AJ in place 
of an agency investigation. The agency, however, is always responsible for issuing a final 
decision on the complaint. Persons interested in the specific requirements of the federal sector 
complaint process should consult the Commission regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1614. 
 14. Id. § 1614.110. 
 15. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.401-.405. Most decisions from the Commission are issued by the 
Director of the Office of Federal Operations under authority delegated to that office. Id. § 
1614.405(a). A select few are issued after consideration by the full Commission. Decisions from 
either source are precedential and reflect Commission policy, though decisions from the 
Commission often involve novel questions of law. Each of the cases discussed in this essay were 
issued by the Commission. 
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right to file a suit in federal court if he or she is unhappy with either the FAD 
or an appellate decision from the Commission.16 
These decisions often provide unique insights on the Commission’s policy 
positions. Unlike guidance or regulations, appeals require the Commission to 
apply general policy to specific factual scenarios. And, most important for 
purposes of this essay, they require the Commission to step into the role of a 
court and show how it would evaluate the legality of certain actions under Title 
VII, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), or the ADA. 
III.  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
Consistent with its broad protective purpose, the ADA provides few limits 
on reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities. The statute 
defines accommodation through examples, such as “making existing facilities 
. . . accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” and “job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant 
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . and other 
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”17 EEOC guidance 
broadly describes accommodations as, “any change in the work environment or 
in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a 
disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.”18 
There are only three instances where accommodation of a person with a 
disability is explicitly not required under the ADA. The first is when the 
requested accommodation is not “reasonable” in the first instance.19 The 
statute does not define “reasonable,” but, according to the Supreme Court, a 
request is reasonable if it is “feasible” or “plausible” in the run of cases.20 The 
second is when an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on the 
operations or finances of the employer.21 Employers can deny reasonable 
accommodations if they impose significant administrative difficulty or 
expense.22 The third is when the person requesting the accommodation is not 
“qualified” to perform the job.23 A person is qualified for a job if he or she 
“satisfies the requisite . . . job-related requirements of the employment position 
such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable 
 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2012). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
 18. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015). 
 19. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002). 
 20. Id. at 401-02. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 22. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p). 
 23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2015). 
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accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.”24 This 
means that the person must be able to complete the essential functions of the 
job either unaided or with the assistance of reasonable accommodation. If a 
person cannot complete an essential function, that person is not qualified. The 
entity does not have to change the function or relieve the person of the duty to 
perform it as an accommodation.25 
In cases involving physical job requirements or attendance standards, the 
qualified inquiry is crucial. Employers often argue that these requirements or 
standards should be considered essential job functions.26 If that argument is 
accepted, then an employee with a disability that prevents him or her from 
meeting a standard is not qualified for the job, even if he or she is otherwise 
able to perform the job. Once the standard is framed as an essential function, 
the employer is no longer required to consider alternative standards or methods 
of measuring performance that the person with a disability might be able to 
meet. In some cases, the acceptance of certain physical job requirements as 
essential functions can result in the automatic exclusion of a whole class of 
persons with disabilities from certain jobs.27 
A second important issue in the qualified inquiry is the scope of 
accommodations to “qualification standards.”28 The ADA prohibits employers 
from: 
[U]sing qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria 
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of 
individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n). 
 26. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 766 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Ford 
successfully argued that an employee who had requested the ability to telework could not meet 
the essential function of predictable on-site job attendance and was therefore not qualified to 
perform the job. Id.; see, e.g., Samper v. Providence St. Vincent, 675 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (9th 
Cir. 2012). Providence St. Vincent successfully argued that a nurse in the neonatal intensive care 
unit was not entitled to an accommodation that exempted her from the essential function or 
regular, predictable attendance. Id. 
 27. For example, in a case involving a deaf employee working in a photography studio, the 
Tenth Circuit found that “verbal communication” was an essential function of the employee’s 
position. See EEOC v. The Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985-87 (10th Cir. 2012). That, of 
course, meant that the plaintiff (and many other individuals with deafness) was categorically 
unqualified to perform the job. It seems unlikely, and contrary to the intent of the ADA, that all 
persons who are unable to communicate verbally are unable to be photography assistants. For a 
better example of a court considering the abilities of individuals with deafness, see Keith v. 
County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 924-27 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that a lifeguard with deafness 
could be otherwise qualified to perform the job). 
 28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (2015). 
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as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in 
question and is consistent with business necessity.29 
The statute frames the defense to a charge of discrimination based on the 
application of a qualification standard as requiring a showing that the standard 
is “job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance 
cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.”30 
That last phrase, “and such performance cannot be accomplished by 
reasonable accommodation” is grammatically murky.31 It could refer to the 
standard itself or it could refer to the performance of the function to which the 
standard is tied. For example, if an employer requires that employees meet a 
certain vision standard and the employer is able to show that the requirement is 
job-related and consistent with the business necessity for the position in 
question, is an applicant only qualified if there is an accommodation that 
permits him or her to meet that vision standard? Or, can the applicant argue 
that he or she is able to perform the job despite not being able to meet the 
standard? 
EEOC guidance documents,32 litigation,33 and amicus briefs34 touch on 
these issues, but they are also dealt with comprehensively in EEOC federal 
sector cases. Three such cases are detailed in the sections below: Alvara v. 
Johnson,35 where the Commission discussed the difference between an 
essential function and an attendance standard; Complainant v. USPS,36 where 
the Commission assessed a physical job requirement as a qualification standard 
 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2015); Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n, No. 
915.002 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP 
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2002), www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommoda 
tion.html. 
 33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *5-7 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 10, 2012); EEOC v. The Picture People, Inc., No. 09-cv-02315-PAB-CBS, 2011 WL 
1754522, at *1, *5 (D. Colo. May 9, 2011). 
 34. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellant and Urging Reversal at 1-3, Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 
101, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-35233) (discussing the availability of accommodations 
to qualification requirements under the ADA); Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiffs-Appellees in Favor of Affirmance at 1-2, Bates v. UPS, 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 04-17295) (discussing the appropriate evaluation of qualification standards under the ADA). 
 35. Alvara v. Johnson, No. 0320110053, 2014 WL 3571431, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 10, 2014). 
 36. Complainant v. Donahoe (USPS), Appeal No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375 
(E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 2013). 
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under the ADA; and Nathan v. Holder,37 where the Commission described the 
scope of accommodation in a qualification standard case. 
IV.  ALVARA V. JOHNSON: ATTENDANCE STANDARDS AS ESSENTIAL 
FUNCTIONS 
Mr. Alvara was employed as a Customs and Border Protection Officer for 
the Department of Homeland Security.38 Mr. Alvara’s facility operated twenty-
four hours a day and officers were rotated in and out of different shifts, 
including a “graveyard shift” that ran from 12:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m.39 
Officers were permitted to voluntarily swap shifts with co-workers if needed.40 
Mr. Alvara had a severe case of sleep apnea and required a consistent sleep 
schedule.41 He requested, and was initially granted, an exemption from 
working the “graveyard” shift as an accommodation to his disability.42 In 
2008, however, a new manager ordered a comprehensive review of light duty 
cases at the facility, including Mr. Alvara’s.43 Mr. Alvara was told after the 
review that he needed to return to working the “graveyard” shift, apply for 
disability retirement, request an accommodation, or resign from his position.44 
Mr. Alvara requested the continuance of his prior accommodation, but his 
supervisors determined that his inability to work the rotating shift made him 
unqualified for his position.45 He then filed a charge of employment 
discrimination.46 
Mr. Alvara’s complaint was initially processed by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB), a body responsible for enforcing the federal 
government’s civil service merit protections.47 Relying on an EEOC decision 
 
 37. Nathan v. Holder, No. 0720070014, 2013 WL 3965241, at *7-8 (E.E.O.C. July 19, 
2013). 
 38. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *1-2. 
 43. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at *2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. There is significant overlap between federal civil service laws that prohibit making 
personnel decisions based on “non-merit factors” and federal equal employment opportunity 
(EEO) laws. Cases that raise both a civil service law claim and an EEO claim are called “mixed-
case appeals” and the complainant has the option of initially going through either the MSPB or 
the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302 (2015). To ensure that one body is not misinterpreting the 
law of the other, mixed case decisions can be appealed to whichever body did not initially hear 
the case. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.161(c), 1201.162(a) (2015). When the two bodies disagree on the 
interpretation of a law a “Special Panel” consisting of one representative from MSPB, one 
representative from the EEOC, and a neutral party appointed by the President and confirmed by 
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from 2008, the MSPB found that working a rotating shift was an essential 
function of Mr. Alvara’s job.48 Since Mr. Alvara could not work a rotating 
shift due to his disability, the MSPB found that he was not qualified for the job 
and dismissed his complaint.49 Mr. Alvara appealed that finding to the 
EEOC.50 
The central question in the case was whether working a rotating shift was 
an essential function of the Customs and Border Officer position at the facility 
where Mr. Alvara worked.51 The EEOC decision said definitively that it was 
not, and further, that a standard related to when a job is performed could never 
constitute an essential function under the ADA.52 
The decision’s reasoning on that point is relatively simple. According to 
the Commission, “[e]ssential functions are the duties of a job, that is, the 
outcomes that must be achieved by someone in that position.”53 A rotating 
shift is not an outcome of a Customs and Border Officer job. It is, instead, a 
“method[] . . . by which a person accomplishes” the duties of a Customs and 
Border Officer.54 As a method of performing the job and not a fundamental 
duty of the job itself, the requirement to work a rotating shift is subject to 
accommodation—including a request like Mr. Alvara’s that the individual be 
excused from meeting the requirement.55 To view a requirement related to 
when a person performs the job as an essential function, in the Commission’s 
view, “leads to the perverse and unacceptable conclusion that any employee 
with disability-related absences is an unqualified individual and, therefore, 
unable to claim the protections of the [ADA].”56 
That finding was not the end of the Commission’s analysis though. 
Rotating shift requirements and other standards related to when a person 
performs a job might not be essential functions, but they are often important to 
 
the Senate is convened to hear the case. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(6)(A) (2012). The Panels are 
rarely called, but, the MSPB asked for a Special Panel in this case after reviewing the 
Commission’s decision. The Panel ultimately upheld the EEOC’s analysis as the question 
decided—whether a rotating shift is an essential function—was solely within the EEOC’s 
jurisdiction and was not an unreasonable reading of the law. See Alvara v. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., No. DA–0752–10–0223–E–1, 2014 WL 0320110053 (Spec. Pan. Sept. 29, 2014). 
 48. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *3. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at *1. 
 52. Id. at *4-5. 
 53. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“And, as with other methods by which a function is accomplished (e.g. lifting as a 
method of transporting packages or use of certain software as a method of transcribing notes), 
attendance and tuning are subject to the law’s obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation 
that does not impose an undue hardship.”) 
 56. Id. at *5. 
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the operation of a business.57 As with other forms of accommodation, a 
covered entity has the ability to show that providing an exception to a rotating 
shift policy would impose an undue hardship on its operations or finances.58 
Examining the record, the Commission determined that the Department of 
Homeland Security had not shown that accommodating Mr. Alvara’s request 
would impose significant expense or operational difficulty.59 The facility 
where Mr. Alvara worked had approximately 700 officers.60 Those officers 
frequently exchanged shifts and the facility was able to accommodate requests 
to not work certain shifts due to pregnancy, leave, training, and other reasons 
(accommodations that the Department conceded were technically temporary 
but could remain in place for extended periods of time).61 It was also 
uncontested that the facility was able to accommodate Mr. Alvara for a year 
without issue.62 The Department was only able to put forward generalized 
concerns about the impact that accommodating Mr. Alvara might have on the 
morale of other employees, evidence that is not specific enough to show undue 
hardship.63 
The implication of this decision for attendance standards in general is 
obvious. According to the Commission, these standards are never essential 
functions.64 They are instead job standards related to when and how a person 
performs the essential functions of a job.65 As such, a person with a disability 
can request that they be modified or waived. But the mere fact that a person is 
able to request such an accommodation does not mean an employer must 
provide it. The employer can still show that granting that accommodation to 
the person requesting it would impose an undue hardship on its finances or, 
more likely, operation. 
V.  COMPLAINANT V. USPS: PHYSICAL JOB-REQUIREMENTS AS 
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS 
The Complainant in this case bid for a position as a Sales, Services, and 
Distribution Associate (SSD Associate)—essentially a front desk employee—
in a branch of the Denver Post Office.66 She was denied the position because a 
persistent shoulder injury prevented her from lifting more than ten pounds and 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Alvara, 2014 WL 3571431, at *5. 
 59. Id. at *6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Alvara v. Holder, No. 0320110053, 2014 WL 3571431, at *7 (E.E.O.C. July 19, 2014). 
 64. Id. at *4. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Complainant v. USPS, No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375, at *1-2 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 23, 
2013). 
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the Postal Service believed that lifting packages of seventy pounds or more 
was an essential function of the SSD Associate position.67 
The first question before the Commission was whether the Postal Service 
was correct in its description of the essential functions of the SSD Associate 
position.68 In a statement that was repeated in Alvara, the Commission found 
that the “essential functions are the duties of a job – i.e., the outcomes that 
must be achieved by the person in the position.”69 The relevant outcome that 
had to be achieved by a person in the SSD Associate position was “collecting 
and distributing mail” brought in by customers.70 The lifting standard was a 
measure put in place by the Postal Service to determine if a person could 
perform the job as they believe it had to be performed (i.e., the Postal Service 
believed that a person had to lift up to seventy pounds to effectively collect and 
distribute mail brought in by customers).71 In that sense, the lifting requirement 
was a qualification standard that screened out the Complainant on the basis of 
disability.72 
Qualification standards are acceptable under the ADA if the covered entity 
is able to show that the standard is job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.73 According to the Commission, the Postal Service could justify its 
lifting standard by showing that: 
(1) . . . the standard, criteria, or test is ‘job-related and consistent with business 
necessity;’ and (2) . . . that there is no accommodation that would enable the 
person to meet the existing standard or no alternative approach (itself a form of 
accommodation) through which the employer can determine whether the 
person can perform the essential function.74 
The Commission further stated that “[w]hen determining if a standard or 
test is job-related and consistent with business necessity, the central question is 
whether the standard or test is ‘carefully tailored to measure [an individual's] 
actual ability to [perform] the essential function of the job.’”75 In this instance, 
the Commission found that the standard was not carefully tailored.76 It cited 
evidence in the record from a variety of Postal Service employees and officials 
indicating that lifting seventy pounds was only rarely required and that SSD 
Associates only “frequently” lifted packages between twenty and thirty 
 
 67. Id. at *4, *7. 
 68. Id. at *6-7. 
 69. Id. at *7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Complainant v. USPS, 2013 WL 8338375, at *7. 
 72. Id. at *7-8. 
 73. Id. at *8. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. 101-485 (II) at 36, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 353-5). 
 76. Complainant v. USPS, 2013 WL 8338375, at *8. 
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pounds.77 That evidence might “support[] a finding that a lifting requirement 
of 35 pounds would be carefully tailored to measure the Complainant's ability 
to perform the essential functions of a Sales and Distribution Associate at the 
Glendale facility.”78 But it was “far from sufficient for the required showing by 
the Agency that its requirement that Sales and Distribution Associates be able 
to lift up to 70 pounds met this standard.”79 As the Postal Service had failed to 
justify the standard it used to screen out the Complainant, the Commission 
found that it had discriminated against the Complainant on the basis of 
disability.80 
According to this decision, a lifting standard is best considered a 
qualification standard and not an essential function under the ADA, as the 
standard relates to the method by which a person achieves an outcome and is 
not an outcome in and of itself. If an employer uses a lifting requirement to 
disqualify a person with a disability from employment, the employer must be 
prepared to demonstrate that requirement is job-related and consistent with 
business necessity as applied to that person or “carefully tailored to measure 
[an individual’s] actual ability to [perform] th[e] essential function of the 
job.”81 
This interpretation is at odds with how courts tend to examine these 
requirements. In a quick search of the ADA case law, one can find a number of 
cases analyzing whether a lifting requirement is an essential or marginal 
function under the ADA,82 but there are almost no cases analyzing lifting as a 
qualification standard.83 This is largely because plaintiffs have framed their 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at *9. 
 79. Id. The Commission further noted that “[u]ndoubtedly, the Agency may have been able 
to justify a qualification standard that tied a lower lifting requirement to these essential functions. 
But the Agency did not utilize a lower standard and hypothesizing about which standards might 
be sufficient would be speculation on our part.” Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 353-54 (1990). 
 82. See, e.g., EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandbridge & Rice, LLP, No. 1:13-CV-46, slip op. 
at 8, 9 (D.N.C. June 26, 2014); Fornes v. Osceola Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 179 Fed. App’x 633, 635 
(11th Cir. 2006); Dropinski v. Douglas County, 298 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002); Phelps v. 
Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001); Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 931 
(7th Cir. 2001); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1998); Ingerson v. 
Healthsouth Corp., No. 96-6395, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. 1998); Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. Educ., 
145 F.3d 846, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 83. The only decision I could find that even indirectly addressed the issue was an unreported 
order recommendation from a magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois that denied a 
jury instruction that framed a lifting requirement as a work standard. Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, 
Inc., No. 93 C 7096, 1995 WL 478858, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Interestingly, the magistrate 
rejected that framing because he felt job-relatedness was a lower bar than showing that job duty is 
an essential function. Id. 
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challenges this way. In fact, in Complainant v. USPS, both parties had 
addressed the lifting requirement as an essential function.84 The Commission 
corrected that interpretation, saying that: 
Both the Complainant and Agency are mistaken about the central issue in this 
case. The specific lifting requirement imposed by the Agency is not an 
essential function of the position. Rather, it is a qualification standard that has 
been established by the Agency in order to ensure that employees can perform 
the essential functions of the job.85 
Examining a lifting requirement under the qualification standard test 
instead of looking at it as a job function has profound implications for the 
ADA. As the analysis in Complainant illustrates, the evidence required to meet 
the first step in the job-related and consistent with business necessity defense 
will look similar to the evidence required to show that a job function is 
essential. The evidence required by both tests relates largely to how a job is 
actually performed and whether that performance is consistent with the lifting 
that the employer says is required to perform the job.86 But an employer 
defending a qualification standard has to make an additional showing. It must 
show that “such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable 
accommodation.”87 As noted above, the EEOC read this in Complainant as 
requiring a showing “that there is no accommodation that would enable the 
person to meet the existing standard or no alternative approach (itself a form of 
accommodation) through which the employer can determine whether the 
person can perform the essential function.”88 The employee or applicant can 
propose an alternative method of performance or measure of performance that 
he or she meets even if the employer can demonstrate that the standard is 
carefully tailored to measure job performance.89 When a lifting standard is 
viewed as a job function, however, the analysis ends after a finding that it is an 
essential function. If the employee is unable to meet it, then by definition, they 
are unable to perform the job and are not qualified under the ADA. The 
Commission’s interpretation in Complainant, therefore, provides additional 
protections to persons with disabilities by extending the accommodation 
requirement. 
 
 84. Complainant v. USPS, Appeal No. 0120080613, 2013 WL 8338375, at *4 (E.E.O.C. 
Dec. 23, 2013). 
 85. Id. at *7. 
 86. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2015) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is 
essential includes, but is not limited to: . . . (iii) the amount of time spent on the job performing 
the function; . . . (vi) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) the current 
work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.”). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). 
 88. Complainant v. USPS, 2013 WL 8338375, at *8. 
 89. Id. at *8-9. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] JOB FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS, AND ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA 31 
VI.  NATHAN V. HOLDER: ACCOMMODATIONS TO QUALIFICATION STANDARDS 
The analysis in Complainant mentions the accommodation requirement in 
the qualification standards defense, but it does not grapple with it in detail. The 
Nathan case, however, offers a good illustration of the Commission’s view on 
this topic.90 
Jeremy Nathan is an attorney and former officer in the United States 
Army.91 Mr. Nathan has monocular vision due to a detached retina that cannot 
be surgically repaired.92 His impairment was diagnosed during his service in 
the Army and did not result in any restrictions on his military duties.93 After 
Mr. Nathan left the Army, he enrolled in law school.94 Upon graduation he 
applied to work as a Special Agent (SA) in the FBI.95 The FBI denied his 
application due to his monocular vision.96 They argued that applicants had to 
have uncorrected vision of 20/200 in each eye and corrected vision of 20/20 in 
one eye and 20/40 in the other in order to safely perform the functions of a 
SA.97 Mr. Nathan, of course, could not meet this standard, but he argued that 
his background in the Army and his experience in adjusting to his limited 
vision made him able to safely perform the SA job.98 
The question before the Commission was whether the ADA required that 
the FBI give Mr. Nathan the opportunity to demonstrate his ability to safely 
perform the job in spite of his visual impairment.99 Unlike the agencies in 
Alvara and Complainant, the FBI did not argue that the vision standard was an 
essential function of the job.100 They argued instead that the vision standard 
measured whether an applicant could safely perform the essential tasks of an 
SA, such as “clearing a room” (quickly scanning an area to determine if any 
threats were present).101 
The ADA states that a qualification standard “may include a requirement 
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals.”102 EEOC regulations state that a covered entity must show that 
the person with a disability poses a “significant risk of substantial harm to the 
 
 90. See, e.g., Nathan v. Holder, Appeal No. 0720070014, 2013 WL 3965241 (E.E.O.C. July 
19, 2013). 
 91. Id. at *1-2. 
 92. Id. at *1. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at *2. 
 95. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *7. 
 98. Id. at *10. 
 99. Id. at *9-10. 
 100. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *4. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). 
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health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced 
by reasonable accommodation” (often called the “direct threat defense”) in 
order to justify excluding him or her from a job based on safety concerns.103 A 
determination that a person with a disability poses such a risk must be based on 
an “individualized assessment” and rely on “reasonable medical judgment.”104 
Though this test obviously differs from the “job-related” defense laid out in the 
statute, the two standards do not, as the Fifth Circuit noted in EEOC v. Exxon, 
“present hurdles that comparatively are inevitably higher or lower but rather 
require different types of proof.”105 
In Nathan, the Commission found that the FBI had not conducted the 
individualized assessment required by the direct threat defense.106 Specifically, 
the FBI had relied on generalized evidence about the limitations of persons 
with monocular vision and had failed to take Mr. Nathan’s specialized 
experience into account when rejecting his application.107 In addition, the 
Commission stated that a review of Mr. Nathan’s skills on paper alone was not 
sufficient.108 The FBI was required to permit Mr. Nathan to actively 
demonstrate how he was able to perform the SA job even in spite of his 
monocular vision.109 As the order attached to the decision reveals, the only 
effective way for Mr. Nathan to make that showing would be to attend the FBI 
training academy for new agents.110 If he is able to pass, he will have 
demonstrated his ability to safely perform the job using his experience and 
acquired skills.111 
Despite the fact that the Nathan decision discusses the direct threat defense 
and not the job-related defense, it tells us quite a bit about the EEOC’s view on 
how the accommodation requirement works under the job-related defense. As 
the language quoted from the Exxon decision implies,112 when considering a 
safety standard, the difference between the direct threat and job-related 
defenses is one of degree, not kind—particularly as the two are applied in 
EEOC decisions. Both defenses require that the employer consider the standard 
as applied to the individual and not just in general (i.e., the individualized 
 
 103. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2015). 
 104. Id. 
 105. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 106. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *10. 
 107. Id. at *9. 
 108. Id. at *9-10. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *10 (“Notify Complainant of the reporting dates of upcoming New Agent training 
classes. The Agency shall allow Complainant 90 days notice between the successful completion 
of his background investigation and the date on which he is required to report for New Agent 
training. Complainant may request an earlier reporting date if one is available . . . .”) 
 111. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *10. 
 112. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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assessment), and both require that the employer consider accommodations that 
permit the individual to perform the job safely. The relief ordered in Nathan113 
demonstrates that when individuals with disabilities are unable to meet a 
standard they have the right not only to suggest accommodations that enable 
them to meet those standards, but they also have the right to show that they can 
perform the job, with or without accommodation, in spite of the standard. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The decisions in Alvara, Complainant, and Nathan provide three 
significant insights. First, properly drawing the line between essential functions 
and qualification standards is incredibly important to the operation of the 
ADA. The essential functions of a position are the outcomes that a person in 
that position must achieve. They are not the methods that a person uses to 
achieve that outcome or the time at which the outcomes are achieved. Viewing 
a requirement that dictates the method of job performance as an essential 
function relieves the covered entity from the fundamental requirement of the 
ADA—namely, rethinking the way in which a job is performed in order to give 
persons with disabilities a chance to demonstrate their capabilities. 
Second, reasonable accommodations to qualification standards are 
permitted by the statute. If a qualification standard, like a vision test or a lifting 
requirement, screens out a person with a disability, the employer needs to 
consider both accommodations that enable the person to meet the standard and 
alternative standards (or the waiver of the standard), so long as the person is 
otherwise able to perform the job. 
Finally, a finding that a physical job requirement or attendance standard is 
not an essential function does not leave the employer defenseless. An employer 
can show that accommodations to these policies impose an undue hardship on 
its finances or operations, or challenge the effectiveness of any alternative 
measure proposed by the employee or applicant. But, importantly, the 
employer must be open to changes in these practices if those changes will 
permit a person with a disability to successfully perform the job. Rote 
application of a policy, and disqualification of persons with disabilities, is not 
permitted. 
Of course, these decisions only represent the view of the EEOC. The 
courts have, to date, tended to go in a different direction. But the principles 
announced in Alvara, Complainant, and Nathan are in line with the 
fundamental mission of the ADA and deserve considered attention. The ADA 
was meant to open up employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. 
Many persons with disabilities are only able to perform jobs by using methods 
that differ from the methods traditionally used by employees without 
 
 113. Nathan, 2013 WL 3965241, at *10, 14. 
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disabilities. Having employers consider those alternative methods is how the 
promise of the ADA is ultimately fulfilled. 
 
